Journal of Financial Transformation , 2017, vol: 45 pp. 121-128.
In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, new legislation and regulations have pressured banks and insurance companies to reduce their size, leverage, and riskier lines of business in order to avoid another too-big-to-fail debacle. Nonbank financial intermediaries have naturally taken up some of that slack, and, not surprisingly, regulatory scrutiny has turned toward these intermediaries to evaluate whether they could pose similar risks to financial stability that banks did pre-crisis. This article explores whether there is a demonstrable link between the asset management industry and systemic risk.
With E. Saeidinezhad, MI Viewpoints, Feb. 2017.
While a major overhaul of U.S. financial regulation may be unlikely during the early months of the Trump administration, changes should be expected as his nominees to lead the Treasury Department and financial regulatory agencies are confirmed. This will be the biggest turnover in regulatory leadership since the passage in 2010 of the Dodd-Frank Act, and it may prove to be a test for Basel III, the macroprudential policy framework created by the G20 countries in response to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. This short paper describes what can be expected in the near future due to the changes in leadership in many of the regulatory agency.
With E. Saeidinezhad,MI report, Dec. 2016.
A few months ago, we produced a timetable for the implementation of U.S. financial reform under the Dodd-Frank Act.1 One of the main observations was that the legislation did little to consolidate regulation outside of banking. In contrast, the analogous UK reform legislation, the Financial Services Act, made the Bank of England (BoE) the center of UK financial and monetary stability. A 2016 amendment confirmed and strengthened the bank’s role.
Working paper version Chinese version in Financial Market Research, NAFMII, Dec. 2016
With D. Markwardt and K. Savard, MI report, Sept. 2016.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, new legislation and regulation have pressured banks (and insurances) to reduce their size, leverage, and riskier lines of business in order to avoid another too-big-to-fail debacle. Nonbank financial intermediaries have naturally taken up some of that slack and, not surprisingly, regulatory scrutiny has turned toward these intermediaries to evaluate whether they could pose similar risks to financial stability that banks did pre-crisis.Owing to their stunning growth in the past decade, focus among nonbank intermediaries is now centering on asset managers, which include firms offering mutual funds, exchange-traded funds, hedge funds and private equity funds. This report explores whether there is a demonstrable link between the asset management industry and systemic risk.
With E. Saeidinezhad, MI Viewpoints and Banking & Financial Services Policy Report,
35(8) 1-8, July 2016.
The Dodd-Frank Act was the most far-reaching financial regulatory reform in the U.S. since the nation emerged from the Great Depression in the 1930s. The act aims to limit systemic risk, allow for the safe resolution of the largest intermediaries, submit risky nonbanks to greater scrutiny, and reform derivative trading.The public debate is often highly politicized and opinionated when it comes to Dodd-Frank. With that in mind, this paper seeks to assess Dodd-Frank implementation with respect to its initial goal of building “a safer, more stable financial system,” where proprietary trading and the business of banking are separated, and where taxpayers and small business will not have to bail out failing large financial firms.” To make the assessment, the paper first establishes a timeline summarizing the Dodd-Frank final-rule milestones and then compares their implementation to the initial goals.
With D. Markwardt and K. Savard, Banking & Financial Services Policy Report, 34(10) 1-11, Oct. 2015.
The paper is a shorter version of the report below. It aims to clarify the concept of macroprudential policy for a broader audience, cultivating a better understanding of these tools and their implications for broader monetary policy going forward.
Working paper Chinese version in Financial Market Research, NAFMII, Sept. 2015
With D. Markwardt and K. Savard,
MI Report, June 2015.
As many central banks contemplate the normalization of monetary policy, their focus is turning to the promise of macroprudential policy as a tool to manage possible future systemic risk in financial markets. Janet Yellen and Mario Draghi, among others, are pinning much of their hopes for managing financial stability in the context of Basel III on macroprudentialism. Despite central banks’ clear intention that this policy will play a significant role in developed economies, few policymakers or financial players know what macroprudential policy is, much less how to assess its efficacy or necessity. Our report aims to clarify the concept of macroprudential policy for a broader audience, cultivating a better understanding of these tools and their implications for broader monetary policy going forward. The report also advocates the use of more refined indicators for financial cycles as benchmarks for policy discussions on macroprudential policy.
With A.L. Delatte,
Journal of Banking and Finance
In this paper, we propose to identify the dependence structure that exists between returns on equity and commodity futures and its development over the past 20 years. The key point is that we do not impose any dependence structure, but let the data select it. To do so, we model the dependence between commodity (metal, agriculture and energy) and stock markets using a flexible approach that allows us to investigate whether the co-movement is: (i) symmetrical and frequent, (ii) (a) symmetrical and mostly present during extreme events and (iii) asymmetrical and mostly present during extreme events. We also allow for this dependence to be time-varying from January 1990 to February 2012. Our analysis uncovers three major stylised facts. First, we find that the dependence between commodity and stock markets is time-varying, symmetrical and occurs most of the time (as opposed to mostly during extreme events). Second, not allowing for time-varying parameters in the dependence distribution generates a bias towards an evidence of tail dependence. Similarly, considering only tail dependence may lead to false evidence of asymmetry. Third, a growing co-movement between industrial metals and equity markets is identified as early as 2003; this co-movement spreads to all commodity classes and becomes unambiguously stronger with the global financial crisis after Fall 2008.